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I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Japanese Constitution was adopted, the old Civil Code 
under the Meiji Constitution governed family life in Japan.  The old law did 
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not extend suffrage to women, who were also not recognized as being able 
to conclude contracts.  The eldest son, rather than the wife, inherited the 
home and farm upon the death of the father.  These traditions were derived 
from the feudal system of the Edo period.
When the Japanese Constitution of 1947 replaced the Meiji 
Constitution after World War II, universal suffrage was achieved, and 
equality between men and women was declared in Article 14 of the new 
constitution.1 In addition, Article 24 affirmed that a marriage may only 
take place with the mutual consent of both the husband and wife.2 The 
marriage must be maintained through mutual cooperation and on the basis 
of the equal rights of the husband and wife.3
Given these changes, it appears that the legal system that was 
introduced with the new constitution resulted in reforming the Japanese 
family law system.  However, the judiciary has struggled against the current 
of conventional and closed ideas in Japanese society.  The most famous 
case in this regard is the Supreme Court case known as the patricide case,
the facts of which are described later in this paper, which involved a girl 
who was repeatedly raped by her own father.4 She was prosecuted under 
Article 200 of the Criminal Code, which stipulated that a person who kills a 
parent or a spouse’s parent is punishable by death or life imprisonment with 
hard labor.5 At the same time, Article 199 of the Criminal Code stated that 
a person who kills another person shall be punished with death or 
imprisonment with hard labor for not less than three years.6 The Supreme 
Court struck down Article 200 on the basis of Article 14 of the Constitution 
and opined that the means of achieving the law’s goals were too harsh.7
However, it took twenty-two years after this decision for the article to be 
amended by legislature.8
This paper first reviews several cases involving human rights issues 
that have arisen under Japanese family law and the constitution, including 
                                                     
1. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14 (Japan).
2. Id. art. 24.
3. Id.
4 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
5. KYŪ KEIHŌ [OLD PEN. C.] 1880, art. 200 (Japan).
6. Id. art. 199.
7. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
8. KEIHŌ [PEN. C.] (Japan) (deleting art. 200 as last amended by Law No. 91, May 12, 1995); 
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ 
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
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two relevant 2015 Supreme Court decisions.  The Court upheld the
constitutionality of Article 750 of the Civil Code, which requires married 
couples to choose either the husband’s or the wife’s family name, 
emphasizing the tradition of couples using the same family name.9 On the 
other hand, the court struck down Article 733 of the Civil Code, which 
prohibited women from remarrying within six months of a divorce.10 The 
court stated that 100 days was a reasonable period to wait before a woman 
should be permitted to remarry.11
Second, focusing on the justices’ opinions in these two cases, this 
paper will consider the constitutionality of these decisions and the Supreme 
Court’s function of imposing its interpretations on the two other branches 
of government:  the executive and the legislative branches.
II. HISTORY OF THE STATUS OF FAMILY AND WOMEN UNDER 
THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
A. Drafting History of the Japanese Constitution
The Japanese Constitution was adopted on May 3, 1947.12 Under the 
previous (Meiji) constitution, only male adult suffrage was guaranteed with 
regard to the election of public officials, although women participated in the 
general election of the Imperial Diet in 1946.13 Moreover, women were not 
                                                     
9. KYŪ MINPŌ [OLD CIV. C.] 1898, art. 750 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 
2015, Heisei 26 (o) no. 1023, 69(8) SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 2586, 
http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
10. KYŪ MINPŌ [OLD CIV. C.] 1898, art. 733 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 
2015, Heisei 25 (o) no. 1079, 69(8) SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 2427, 
http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
11. Id.
12. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).
13. Hiroko Tomida, The Association of New Women and its Contribution to the Japanese 
Women’s Movement, 17 JAPAN F. 49, 49–51 (2005), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10
.1080/0955580052000337468#aHR0cDovL3d3dy50YW5kZm9ubGluZS5jb20vZG9pL3BkZi8xMC4M
DgwLzA5NTU1ODAwNTIwMDAzMzc0Njg/bmVlZEFjY2Vzcz10cnVlQEBAMA.  Public officials 
were purged from public service on January 4, 1946, and universal suffrage was achieved on April 10 of 
that year. Rebuilding of Political Parties and General Election, NAT’L DIET JAPAN: MODERN JAPAN IN 
ARCHIVES, http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description05.html#c551 (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). In 
spite of these prohibitions, and before the current constitution was established, Raichō Hiratsuka worked 
to achieve universal suffrage around 1920, and Hiratsuka, Husae Ichikawa, and Mumeo Oku established 
the New Women's Association (Shin Fujin Kyoukai). Tomida, supra note 13.  See also DAI NIHON 
TEIKOKU [MEIJI KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).
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able to form political associations or take part in political activities under 
the Maintenance of Public Order Act, known as Chian Iji Hou.14
Also, under the old Civil Code15 and the Meiji Constitution, the eldest 
son was the head of the family and succeeded to all property, including the 
house and the land, when the head of the household passed away. 16
Married women were not competent to take legal action, and in a divorce, 
women were not eligible for the right to the distribution of property.17 In 
addition, only women were subject to criminal liability for adultery under 
the old Criminal Code.18
When the United States General Headquarters (GHQ) and the 
Japanese government worked together to propose the draft of the new 
constitution, General Courtney Whitney hired Ms. Beate Sirota Gordon to 
work on provisions related to human rights. 19 She advanced women’s 
rights in the draft of the constitution.20 The provisions for women became 
more advanced at that time, and the equality of men and women was legally 
acknowledged.21 The articles she drafted included those related to both 
women and children.  For example, pregnant women and women with 
children would be protected under the new constitution and would be 
subsidized when necessary.22 Illegitimate children would not be legally 
discriminated against and would be given the same rights as legitimate 
children. 23 Adopting a child would require the consensus of both the 
husband and wife, and the adopted child would be treated equally as a 
                                                     
14. Chian Iji Hou [Maintenance of Public Order Act], Law No. 46 of 1925 (Japan) (The 
Maintenance of Public Order Act is also sometimes called the Peace Preservation Law).  See also
MASASHI TSUJIMOTO & YOKO YAMASAKI, THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN JAPAN (1600–2000) 71 
(2017).
15. KYŪ MINPŌ [OLD CIV. C.] 1898, art. 732, 749–51, 964 (Japan).
16. Id. arts. 754–55, 807, 964(3) (noting that there was an exception for a female head of 
household, although her authority was more limited than a male’s authority).
17. Id. art. 732 (Japan).
18. KYŪ KEIHŌ [OLD PEN. C.] 1880, art. 183 (Japan).  This system was abolished by 
amendments to the Civil and Criminal Codes in 1947.  Kanako Takayama, Reform of the Criminal 
Justice System in Japan, 82 INT’L REV. PEN. L. 245, 245 (2011); HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868 
297–98 (Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005).
19. BEATE SIROTA GORDON, THE ONLY WOMAN IN THE ROOM 104 (1st ed. 1997).
20. Id. at 106.
21. Id. at 107–08, 113–16, 125.  Later, Ms. Gordon noted that the United States Constitution 
did not have specific provisions for women’s rights. Id. at 107–08.
22. GORDON, supra note 19, at 111.
23. Id. at 117–18.
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member of the family.24 The privilege of the eldest son would be abolished,
and every child would be given equal opportunity in spite of the 
circumstances of his or her birth. 25 Compulsory education would be 
required for eight years in public school.26 Middle and higher education 
would be provided free of charge.27 The government would be authorized 
to support gifted children.28 All children would be eligible to receive free 
medical treatment for their teeth and eyes.29 School-aged children could 
not engage in full-time employment.30 Regarding adults, every adult person 
would be given the right to pursue an occupation.31 If he or she could not 
obtain it, the government would provide the necessary minimum financial 
support.32 Women would be eligible for any occupation, including political 
positions, and they would receive the same wage as that of males who 
provided the same service.33
The Japanese government objected to Ms. Gordon’s drafts, because 
the Japanese had no background to accept equality between men and 
women. 34 However, this twenty-two-year-old woman’s opinion was 
reflected in Articles 14 and 24 of the Japanese Constitution.35 She referred 
to Articles 109, 119, and 122 of the Weimar Constitution, the First 
Amendment of the United States (U.S.) Constitution, the Finland 
Constitution, and the 1924 Soviet Constitution.36
                                                     
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 118.
27. GORDON, supra note 19, at 118
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. GORDON, supra note 19, at 118.
33. Id. See also MIYOKO TSUJIMURA, KENPŌ TO KAZOKU [CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY] 79–
84 (Nihon Kajo Shuppan 2016) (Japan).
34. TATSUO SATO, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ SEITEI SI [HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN]
(Yuhikaku 1962) (Japan).
35. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 14, 24 (Japan).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. I.; Finland Constitution (Suomen perustuslaki), Ch. 2 § 6, 1999;
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS [SOVIET CONSTITUTION] Jan. 31, 1924 
(Soviet Union); DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS [WEIMAR CONSTITUTION] Aug. 11, 1919, 
art. 109, 119, 122 (Ger.); GORDON, supra note 19, at 107–08.
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B. Three 1986 Statutes of Women in Society
A constitution typically binds the government in its relations with its 
citizens but not the relationships of private citizens among themselves.  It is 
controversial when the constitution is applied to relationships between 
private citizens.  One famous case is the Nissan automobile case in which 
Nissan set different retiring ages for males (sixty years old) and females 
(fifty-five years old).37 The Supreme Court ruled the employment provision 
void under Article 9038 of the Civil Code.39
The textbook on the Constitution of Japan classifies relationships
among private parties into three positions.40 The first position emphasizes 
constitutional values and that constitutional norms are not directly
applicable to the relationship between publishers and authors.41 The second 
position uses general basic provisions of the Civil Code to affect a 
constitutional norm between private parties. 42 If a contract exists, the 
constitutional norm applies through basic principles, such as the bona fide
(good faith) articles of the Civil Code used to interpret a contract.43 If there 
is no contract, as in the case of a traffic accident, then principles that guide 
public order and morality are applied.44
The third position recognizes no effect of a constitutional norm in 
relationships between private parties. 45 Only statutes can assist with 
providing a remedy.  The Japanese Supreme Court has not clarified which 
position it is likely to take.46 Currently, German constitutional theory is 
                                                     
37. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 24, 1982, Showa 54(o) no. 750, 35 SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 300, http://www.courts. go.jp (Japan).
38. MINPŌ [CIV. C.] art. 90 (Japan).
39. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 24, 1982, Showa 54(o) no. 750, 35 SAIBANSHO
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 300, http://www.courts. go.jp (Japan).
40. KOJI SATO, NIHON KOKU KENPŌ RON [JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] 164–69 (Seibundo 
2011) (Japan) [hereinafter SATO 2011]; TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, MUTSUO NAKAMURA, KAZUYUKI 
TAKAHASHI & KATSUTOSHI TAKAMI, KENPŌ I [CONSTITUTION I] 248–56 (Yuhikaku 2012) (Japan) 
[hereinafter NONAKA ET AL. I].
41. SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165, 166–69; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 250–51.
42. MINPŌ [CIV. C.] arts. 90, 709 (Japan).
43. SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 249–50.
44. SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 249–50.
45. SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 165; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 249–50.
46. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 12, 1973, Showa 43 (o) no. 932, 27 SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1536, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 
July 19, 1974, Showa 42 (gyo tsu) no. 59, 28 SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 790, 
http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
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influential.  Advocates of German constitutional studies argue that the state 
has a duty and responsibility to protect the rights of private citizens against 
infringement by a private third party.47
Shigenori Matsui argues that the three above-mentioned classifications 
should be abandoned.48 Matsui classifies the relationship between statutes 
and private parties into four types.49 The first type is when a specific statute 
orders a certain action by a private party.50 The second is when a specific 
statute authorizes a private citizen to act.51 The third occurs when there is 
no statute.52 Finally, the fourth type occurs when a specific statute prohibits 
a private citizen from acting.53 Matsui argues that the “public welfare” 
doctrine would apply in the first and second cases.54 In the fourth case, no 
state responsibility arises.55 In the third case, private action is permitted 
and not prohibited by any statute.56
Even after the Japanese Constitution was adopted, the gender role 
model in the family was partially maintained.  Court decisions and the 
Japanese legal system, which are based on civil law, have influenced the 
lives of people as well.  For the family environment in Japan, three statutes 
enacted in 1986 promoted the social status of women, addressed lifestyle 
and work life, and provided opportunities for women to work outside.57
                                                     
47. TAKESHI OYAMA, KIHONKEN HOGO NO HŌRI [PRINCIPLE REGARDING PROTECTION OF 
BASIC RIGHTS] (Seibundo 1998) (Japan); see also SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 168.
48. SHIGENORI MATSUI, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] 325–26 (Yuhikaku 
2007) (Japan).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. MATSUI, supra note 48.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 324.
57. Danjo Koyō Kikai Kintou Hou [Act on Securing Equal Employment Opportunity and 
Treatment Between Men and Women in Employment], Law No. 113 of 1972, translated in (Japanese 
Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [hereinafter Danjo]; Roudousha 
Haken Jidyou no Tekiseina Uneino Kakuho Oyobi Haken Roudousha no hogo tou ni Kansuru Houritsu 
[Act for Securing the Proper Operation of Worker Dispatching Undertakings and Improved Working 
Conditions for Dispatched Workers], Law No. 88 of 1985, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT 
DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [hereinafter Roudousha] (noting this act is sometimes 
also called the Temporary Staffing Services Law (emphasis added)); Kokumin Nenkin-hō [National
Pension Law], Law No. 141 of 1947, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp (as amended in 1959, and again in 2012 by Law No. 99) 
[hereinafter Kokumin].
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First, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (Danjo Koyo Kikai 
Kintou Hou) prohibits gender discrimination in the workplace. 58 Its 
purpose was to promote equality in recruitment, employment, and 
retirement or dismissal.59 In 1997, this law was partially amended and 
regulations to protect women, such as the prohibition of overtime or 
midnight work, were abolished.60 According to its original goal, however,
the revised act does still require legally equal treatment in recruitment, 
employment, and retirement or dismissal.61
Second, the Temporary Staffing Services Law (Roudousha Haken 
Jigyou no Tekiseina Uneino Kakuho Oyobi Haken Roudousha no hogo tou 
ni Kansuru Houritsu) provides for certain employment conditions and 
guarantees the rights of employees.62 Employers typically hire temporary 
workers at cheaper rates than regular workers.  Workers can choose flexible 
working styles.  This Temporary Staffing Services Law has been amended 
several times.63 The 2006 revised Act provided an extension of part time 
workers’ contracts, as well as improvements to welfare expenses.64
Third, the National Pension Act provides tax reductions for female 
homemakers who belong to Category III Insured as defined by the National 
Pension (Kokumin-Nenkin-Dai-San-Gou-Hi-Hokensha).65
Only those with income under 1.3 million yen receive a tax reduction 
for filing income taxes as a husband’s dependent.66 This law classifies 
people in Japan into three categories. Category I is for self-employed 
persons, students, and unemployed persons.67 Category II is for public 
officials or salaried workers.68 Persons in this category receive the common 
national pension in addition to a welfare pension.69 Category III is for 
unemployed wives of persons in Category II.70 Unemployed wives do not 
                                                     
58. Danjo, supra note 57, at art. 5.
59. Id. art. 1.
60. Id. arts. 27–31.
61. Id. arts. 5–6.
62. Roudousha, supra note 57.
63. Id. (noting that the Temporary Staffing Services Law was amended in 1999 and 2006 
(emphasis added)).
64. Id. art. 40(2) (as most recently amended by Law No. 82 in 2016).
65. Kokumin, supra note 57, at art. 7(3).
66. Id.
67. Id. art. 7(1).
68. Id. art. 7(2).
69. Id. (noting, for example, that public officials need to pay welfare insurance premium).
70. Kokumin, supra note 57, at art. 7(3).
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have to pay tax, because they are their husbands’ dependents for the 
purpose of receiving a pension.71 If the wives work outside the home and 
earn over 1.3 million yen, they must pay employee pension and social 
insurance premiums.72
Another limitation has prevented wives from working outside of the 
home, a spousal deduction for housewives who can claim the deduction as 
long as their income is less than 1.3 million yen a year. 73 Japanese 
housewives have been reluctant to earn more than 1.3 million yen a year.  
The obligation to pay higher taxes associated with higher earnings may 
limit their revenue-making capacity when they decide to work outside the 
home.
In late 2016, the Japanese government revised the spouse dependent 
deduction from 1.3 to 1.5 million yen per year.74 This revision requires 
companies to change their regulations in order for spouses to receive 
additional payments.75 This is a reflection that family life in Japan is 
changing.
III. DECISIONS UNDER THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
The Supreme Court is the last and highest court in the judiciary under 
the Japanese Constitution.76 Japanese lower courts have concrete judicial 
review under Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution. 77 The judiciary 
reviews disputes of law under the Court Act.78
                                                     
71. Id.
72. Haigūsha Kōjo [Spouse Deduction], National Tax Agency Regulation No. 1191 of 2014, 
http://www.nta.go.jp/taxanswer/shotoku/1191.htm (Japan).
73. Id.; see also Kokumin, supra note 57, at art. 7(3).
74. Haigūsha Kōjo Oyobi Haigūsha Tokubetsu Kōjo no Minaosi ni Tsuite [About Revision of 
Spouse Deduction and Spouse Special Deduction], NAT’L TAX AGENCY, https://www.nta.go.jp/
gensen/haigusya/index.htm (Japan) (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) [hereinafter About Revision of Spouse 
Deduction].  Nen Zeisei Taikō Wo Kakugi Kettei [Cabinet Decision on Fiscal Year 2005 Taxation 
Outline Deduction of Spouse Deduction etc.], NIKKEI SHIMBUN (Dec. 22, 2016, 13:32), http://
blog.goo.ne.jp/kzunoguchi/e/937b9d3c573216bece30277a3bd29bb1?fm=entry_awc(Japan) [hereinafter 
Fiscal Year 2005 Taxation].
75. About Revision of Spouse Deduction, supra note 74; Fiscal Year 2005 Taxation, supra
note 74.
76. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81 (Japan).
77. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 8, 1952, Showa 27 (ma) no. 23, 6(9) SAIBANSHO
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 783, http://www.courts. go.jp (Japan).
78. Saibansho Hou [Japanese Court Act], Law No. 48 of 2013, art. 3(1), translated in 
(Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp.
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Under the new Japanese Constitution, pre-war family conventions 
have survived and have emerged in Japanese courts in several cases.  The 
Japanese judiciary took part in introducing human rights concepts to the 
Japanese people through Articles 14 and 24 of the Japanese Constitution.79
When the constitutionality of statutes, orders, regulations, or their 
disposition is in dispute and a precedent is overruled, the Grand Bench of 
the Supreme Court reviews the case.80 The Petty Court can review the case, 
if it is clear, by referring to Grand Bench decisions.81
Japanese Constitutional Law courses teach that Article 14 of the 
Japanese Constitution declares equal opportunities, not equal outcomes.  
One explanation is that the classes enumerated under Article 14 of the 
Japanese Constitution, which state that there shall be no discrimination in 
political, economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social 
status, or family origin, have historically been used as justification for 
discrimination. 82 Per se distinctions based on these enumerated classes are 
presumed to be discriminatory.  The government must argue that 
differential treatment is reasonably constitutional.83 However, different 
treatment based on the effort and ability of the individual is considered 
constitutional.
In other differential treatment, in spite of effort and origin, people are 
sometimes in weak or fragile situations. Social rights as provided in 
Article 25 of the Japanese Constitution 84 take on the role of assisting 
economically fragile people. 85 A person who argues that differential 
treatment is unconstitutional takes on the burden of proving that it is 
unconstitutional.86
                                                     
79. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 14, 24 (Japan).
80. Id. art. 81.
81. Id. arts. 80–81.
82. Id. art. 14.
83. SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 196, 208; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap 
Press of Harv. U. Press, rev. ed. 1999) (discussing how Rawls theory has been influential on Japanese 
constitutional studies).
84. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 25 (Japan).
85. Some Japanese constitutional scholars think Article 25 represents the political agenda with 
no legal norm.  See SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 363; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 502–03.
86. Yuichiro Tsuji, Article 9 and the History of Japan’s Judiciary:  Examining its Likeness to 
American and German Courts, 68 TSUKUBA J.L. & POL. 35 (2016) (Japan); see also SATO 2011, supra 
note 40, at 196, 208; NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note 40, at 278.
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A. The Patricide Case and Article 200 of the Criminal Code
One of the most famous cases, referenced earlier in this paper, 
concerns patricide.  The case involves a junior high school student who was 
repeatedly raped by her own father.87 Her mother left the house after 
learning that her own daughter was pregnant by her husband. 88 The
daughter tried to leave as well, but in vain.89 She had five children as a 
result of the rapes, two of whom died.90 Another six were aborted and she 
later underwent sterilization.91 When she was twenty-nine, she met a man 
at her workplace that she was eager to marry.92 She did not run away at that 
point because her sister, who was still living at home, might have been put 
in danger.93 Upon telling her father about her work colleague, he became 
angry, put her in confinement, and raped her.94 Eventually, she became 
desperate and strangled him.95 At that time, she was twenty-nine years old 
and her father was fifty-three years old.96
                                                     
87. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Charles Qu, Parricide, 
Equality and Proportionality:  Japanese Courts’ Attitude Towards the Equality Principle as Reflected in 
Aizawa v Japan, 8 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. ¶ 4 (2001).
88. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 45 (a) no. 1310, 27(3) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 265, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); Qu, supra note 87.
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In 1973, the Grand Bench of the Japanese Supreme Court97 struck 
down Article 200 98 of the Criminal Code.  While accepting the law’s 
purpose that children should respect parents, the court felt that the penalty 
was too harsh to be sustained, as compared to the punishment for regular 
murder provided under Article 199.99
Among the fifteen justices who reviewed this decision, Justice Takezo 
Shimoda’s dissenting opinion noted that Article 200 should be left to the 
legislature, not to the court.100 Six justices concurring still objected to the 
majority opinion approving special provisions for patricide.101 At the end, 
fourteen justices, with one dissenting, decided the case.102 Eight justices 
upheld the court’s reasoning, with six dissenting.103 Accepting this decision 
that declared the law unconstitutional, the Ministry of Justice sent an 
official notice that Article 199 should be applied, even in cases of 
patricide.104
In 1995, Article 200 was deleted by the legislature, after some twenty 
years.105 Some conservative members in the ruling party have objected, 
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favoring Article 200 of the Criminal Code, even after this decision. 106
Decisions declaring a law unconstitutional under concrete judicial review 
do not delete the provisions of the statutes.107 Under Article 41 of the 
Japanese Constitution, the sole and highest organ of the state to pass a bill 
is the Diet.108 Therefore, only the legislature can amend statutes at their 
own discretion.
This case shows an instance where the Japanese judiciary assumed the 
role of introducing the concepts of human rights and equality to the 
Japanese people.109
B. Article 900(iv), Constitutional Order of 1995
The Civil Code governs relationships regarding family and between 
couples.110 The first sentence of Article 900, Item iv of the Civil Code, 
provides different inheritance distributions between legitimate and 
illegitimate children.111
The Japanese judiciary determined Article 900 to be constitutional in 
1995.112 In this case, a girl named Masao Tabata was born in a very 
conventional family during the Meiji Constitution era and under the old 
Civil Code.113 Her older brother had already passed away.114 Her father 
Tonesaku Tabata wanted her to keep his family name, Tabata. 115 His 
daughter Masao married four times in attempts to keep the family name and 
two of the marriages were considered legal.116
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In this particular case, the father adopted Masao’s husband as his 
son.117 The second marriage to Gensaku, father of Katsuhiko Fukunishi, 
was not considered a legal marriage due to the strong objections of the 
father.118 Katsuhiko was born as an illegitimate child between Gensaku and 
Masao, but was taken away from them and given to the Fukunishi family.119
The Fukunishi family had no son at that time and Katsuhiko was, in fact, 
their sole heir.120 Two years later, the Fukunishi family had a son, and it 
became undesirable to adopt Katsuhiko as a legal son.121 The father of the 
Fukunishi family acknowledged Katsuhiko as an illegitimate child, even 
though the father of Fukunishi was not the biological father.122 Even after 
the old Civil Code was amended, the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate children still remained under Article 900 of the Civil Code.123
Some of the relatives in the Tabata family complained that the child 
Katsuhiko should not be eligible to succeed because he left the Tabata 
family and his children should not be eligible to succeed to their 
grandmother's inheritance.124 They pointed out that the new Civil Code was 
very beneficial for the grandchildren of Katsuhiko. 125 Katsuhiko was 
discriminated against by his birth family, the Tabatas, because he grew up 
with the Fukunishi family, and he was also discriminated against by the 
Fukunishi family for being born in the Tabata family.126
The majority of the Supreme Court thought that the distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate was reasonable in so far as it respects 
legal marriage and protects illegitimate children, and its distinction was not 
clearly or remarkably unreasonable in relation to the legislative purpose.127
It seems that the 1995 order rested on the belief that the inheritance 
system was based on the individual, and that the provisions regarding 
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statutory shares of inheritance were designed to operate in a supplementary 
way in cases where there is no designation by testament.128 The 1995 order 
supported legislative intent in favor of constitutionality through a multitude 
of factors.  When designing the system, tradition, social environment, 
perception of the people, other factors have to be considered, and the 
system of inheritance in each country more or less reflects these factors.
Furthermore, a contemporary system of inheritance is closely related to the 
idea of family in a given country, and the system cannot be established 
without considering the rules of marriage and family in that country.  It 
should be concluded that the way the inheritance system is established is 
left to the reasonable discretion of the legislature by taking all these into 
consideration.129
The 1995 order noted: As long as the Civil Code adopts the principle 
of legal marriage, the provision gives preferential treatment to the spouse 
who has been in a marital relationship with the deceased and his or her
child(ren) in terms of the statutory share in inheritance, while at the same 
time, it assures that a child born out of wedlock will have a certain statutory 
share in inheritance so as to protect such child.130
This order held that legislative discretion was not excessively 
unreasonable in relation to the reason for enacting Article 900 of the Civil 
Code, and that it did not exceed the scope of reasonable discretion granted 
to the legislature.  There were concurring opinions from Justices Itsuo 
Sonobe, Tsuneo Kabe, Katsuya Onishi, Hideo Chikusa, and Shinichi 
Kawai.131
C. The Dissenting Opinion in the 1995 Order Would Become Mainstream 
in the Courts
Justices Toshijirou Nakajima, Masao Ohno, Hisako Takahashi,
Yukinobu Ozaki, and Mistuo Endo wrote dissenting opinions. 132 The 
dissenting justices thought that distinction by origin went unconstitutionally 
beyond the scope of the legislative purpose of supporting legal marriage 
                                                     
128. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 5, 1995, Heisei 3 (kyo) no. 143, 49(7) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1789, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan); see also Kazuhiro Ohishi, 
Rippou furakui ni taisuru sihō sinsa [Judicial Review on Legislative Omission], 14 HAKUOH REV. L. &
POL. 171 (2007) (Japan).
129. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 5, 1995, Heisei 3 (kyo) no. 143, 49(7) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1789, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (Nakajima, J., Ohno, J., Takahashi, J., Ozaki, J., & Endo, J., dissenting).
154 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1
and protecting children.133 They explained that Articles 14 and 24 of the 
Japanese Constitution set the limitations of legislative discretion.134 These 
five dissenting opinions became the majority in the 2013 order.135 They 
were of the opinion that the children were subject to uncontrollable 
attribution beyond reasonable distinction.136 The purpose of the law and the 
means to achieve the distinction should be substantially related.
Reasonableness alone could not be sustained in this case.  Supporting 
legal marriage might be reasonable, but the distinction between legitimate 
and illegitimate children was beyond their will and effort.  The distinction 
gave the social impression that illegitimate children were inferior to 
legitimate children.137 The legislative fact might have been consistent at 
that time, but it has changed significantly since then.  Social impressions, 
changes in foreign countries’ legal systems, domestic movement to amend 
the statute or conclude treaty, and changed legislative fact should be 
considered when reviewing the provision.138
The dissenting opinion noted that the decision declaring the provision 
unconstitutional should not be retroactive in effect because it might infringe 
on the legal stability of this case.139 This opinion did not constitute the 
majority in 1995. Reading only the majority opinion, and not the dissenting 
opinion, it would be doubtful to conclude that the 2013 order referenced 
legislative facts in support of constitutionality so much changed that they 
were completely lost in the eighteen years since the 1995 order.  In the 
patricide case, it took twenty-two years before legislative action followed 
through.140 Legislative fact theory is a useful tool for a majority of justices 
to persuade others.  It might be easier for a justice to declare statutes 
obsolete and to ask the legislature to revise in order to avoid serious 
conflicts with the parliament.
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D. The 2013 Order That Declared the Provision Unconstitutional 
In the 2013 order, ancestor "A" passed away in July 2001, and the 
heirs argued that the provisions of Article 900(iv) were unconstitutional 
under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution. 141 The Supreme Court 
vacated and remanded the case to the High Court by holding the provisions 
in Article 900(iv) unconstitutional.142
The Supreme Court explained that the inheritance system sets rules as 
to who is to inherit the property of the decedent, and in order to define the
inheritance system, the circumstances in each country such as the tradition, 
social conditions, and public sentiments should be taken into 
consideration. 143 Furthermore, since the modern inheritance system is 
closely related to the concept of a family, it cannot be defined without
ignoring the rules, people's perceptions, etcetera. regarding marital or 
parent-child relationships in the country.  It is left to the reasonable 
discretion of the legislature to define the inheritance system while 
comprehensively considering all these factors.  The major issue disputed in 
the present case was, within the inheritance system defined in that manner, 
whether or not the distinction made by the provision in terms of the 
statutory shares in inheritance between children born in wedlock and 
children born out of wedlock constituted discriminatory treatment without 
reasonable grounds.  “If there is no reasonable ground for making such 
distinction even when the abovementioned discretionary power vested in 
the legislative body is taken into consideration, it is appropriate to construe 
that said distinction is in violation of Article 14, paragraph 1 of the 
Constitution.”144
Differential treatment relates to the distinction of legal marriage and 
de facto marriage.  The Japanese Civil Code respects legal marriage over a 
de facto marriage.145
The Japanese Civil Code, revised in 1947, abolished the principle that 
the eldest son was the head of the family and preserved the right to 
succession.146 The code still stated, however, that the statutory share for a 
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child born out of wedlock would be one half that of a child born in 
wedlock, under Article 900.147
The 2013 Supreme Court Order held that the provision in Article 900, 
Item iv of the Civil Code was unconstitutional.148 The Supreme Court 
explained that this provision would control in the absence of a designation 
of the shares in inheritance by a will.149 The Supreme Court reviewed the 
limits of legislative discretion under Article 14 of the Japanese 
Constitution.  The factors to review, such as tradition, social conditions, and 
public sentiments, would change along with the times.
The judiciary constantly reviews individuals’ dignity and equality 
under the law.  The facts based on the 1947 Civil Code have changed.  In 
1947, the prevailing traditional obstacle for equal treatment under the new 
constitution was that the eldest son was the head of the family.150 At that 
time, when revising the code, the family law system and other systems of 
inheritance in other countries were referenced.  Since then, circumstances 
surrounding legal marriage in Japan have changed in line with changes in 
social and economic circumstances, and people's perceptions of marriage 
and family have changed as well.  People's lifestyles have also changed.  
All of these changes brought about the evolution in the inheritance system 
in the Civil Code.
Japan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) in 1979. 151 However, the 1995 order recognized differential 
inheritance treatment between children born in wedlock and those born out 
of wedlock. 152 The United Nations Human Rights Committee advised 
Japan to remove the distinction.153 The 1995 order deemed Article 900 of 
the Civil Code to be constitutional. 154 Five justices dissented and 
questioned its reasonableness because, by that time, the form of marriage 
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and parent-child relationships had already changed.155 The reasonableness 
of supporting a distinction between children born in wedlock and those 
born out of wedlock was no longer supported.  It was deemed 
unconstitutional in July 2001.156 The reason why the court in the 2013 
order used this date is because the Japanese court had exercised judicial 
review on this issue in a concrete case in July 2001.157
It is not clear which factors made the court change its perspective, but 
Article 900(iv) was held unconstitutional in the 2013 order.158 However, it 
did not overrule the 1995 order.159 The losing party made a special appeal 
(Tokubetu Koukoku) to the Supreme Court and argued infringement of the 
statutes in the case.160 The Court made the decision in a special order.161
The standard of judicial review is puzzling, because the Supreme Court 
declared the 1995 order to be unconstitutional but did not overrule it.  
Yasuyuki Watanabe explains that not every judicial review holds the 
purpose and means to achieve a goal.162 Kazuhiko Ohishi explains that the 
general standard of judicial review did not change with the 2013 order and 
that only the legislative facts had changed, at least in July 2001, and the 
two-step review for the purpose and means to achieve a goal was not used 
in the 2013 order.163
One explanation is that legislative fact is included in the Civil Code, 
unlike other constitutional decisions,164 in relation to the Criminal Code.  In 
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cases in which the constitutionality of a certain criminal sanction is 
disputed, 165 actions such as conducting unauthorized business are 
prosecuted.  The court revealed a lack of attention by the legislature, but as 
in the 1995 order, changes in legislative fact were helpful to the justices in
asking parliament to amend the Civil Code—to avoid serious conflict and
allow a longer time to amend the statute so as to encourage the legislature 
to amend it.  However, legal stability regarding predictability may be lost in 
making such decisions.166 The 2013 order was based so much on reasoning 
surrounding human dignity that it did not even mention the provisions of 
the constitution.167
In sum, this 2013 order limited the effect of the unconstitutional 
decision by not overruling its precedent.  However, there is another way to 
restrict its effect by time scale.
E. Time Limit of the 2013 Order in Declaring A Law Unconstitutional
Three months after the 2013 decision, Article 900(iv) of the Civil 
Code was amended in the parliament with a very quick resolution compared 
with the patricide case.168 One of the reasons for the quick response was 
the effect of a decision declaring a law unconstitutional.  The 2013 order 
recognized that the unconstitutional conditions began in 2001, sending an 
easily understandable message to the legislature.
The Civil Code provides that succession occurs when an ancestor 
passes away.169 The new provision of the Civil Code regarding succession 
occurred after September 5, 2013.170 The amended provision of the Civil 
Code applies only to cases in which there is a legitimate and an illegitimate 
child. 171 The Supreme Court held the provision unconstitutional on 
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September 4, 2013.172 The 2013 order noted a few points for succession 
cases that occurred before September 5, 2013.  
The court noted that on July 2001 at the latest has no effect on any 
legal relationships that have already been fixed by rulings or other judicial 
decisions on division of estate, agreements on division of estate or other 
agreements, etcetera made on the assumption of the provision of the first 
sentence of the proviso to said item with regard to other cases of inheritance 
that have commenced during the period after July 2001 until said judgment 
is made.173
The Supreme Court reserved several comments on the time scale.  
First, Article 900(iv) was unconstitutional for inheritance cases beginning 
in July 2001.174 Second, the unconstitutional order did not control decisions 
or agreements for distributions of the family court from 2001 to 2013.175
The Ministry of Justice explains that the 2013 order has de facto binding 
power.176 The 2013 order applies to similar cases that occur thereafter.  In 
some cases, partition of inheritance takes time after the ancestor passes
away, even if succession already occurred.
After September 4, 2013, if an heir wanted to fix distribution for a case 
in which succession occurred between July 2001 and September 4, 2013, 
the distribution between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child would 
be the same.177 If the distribution for an heir had already been fixed by an 
agreement or judgment, the legal relationships had already been completed, 
and the 2013 order would not hold.  The Ministry of Justice explains that if 
the partition of inheritance is not completed, then the legal relationship is 
not yet fixed.178 An order by the family court or an agreement among heirs 
completes inheritance and fixes the legal relationship.179 The Ministry of 
Justice released a notice to keep legal stability, consistent with this instance 
of concrete judicial review.180 The 2013 order restricts the influence of the 
Supreme Court order on a time scale, based on legal stability of the family 
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relationship once twelve years has passed.181 Thus, it has de facto binding 
power.
The legislature has the responsibility to amend a statute after a 
decision by the Supreme Court declares it unconstitutional, but the Japanese 
Constitution does not specify a reasonable period for the legislature to 
amend or abolish a statute.182 The constitution granted legislative power to 
the Diet, but legislative inaction might permit a party to ask for damages 
under the State Redress Act (Kokka Baishou Hou).183
F. Nationality Act Decision of 2008
The Supreme Court held Article 3(1) of the Nationality Act184 to be 
unconstitutional in 2008.  The Supreme Court used the purpose and means 
review approach.  Here, two cases were decided on the same date—June 4.  
In the first case, the child of an unmarried Philippine mother and a Japanese 
father submitted an application for nationality to the Ministry of Justice on 
the grounds that the child received affiliation through the father after he was 
born.185 The ministry denied the application.186
In the second case, a son and a mother were ordered to leave Japan 
because they lacked Japanese nationality. 187 Under the Immigration 
Control and Refugee Recognition Act, 188 their objections were denied.  
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They argued that Article 3(1) of the Nationality Act was unconstitutional 
under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution.189
The Japanese Nationality Act uses jus sanguinis to determine 
nationality.190 A child has the nationality of his or her father or mother, 
regardless of his or her birthplace.191 Article 2 of this act provides that a 
child is a Japanese citizen if his or her mother or father is a Japanese citizen 
at the time the child is born.192 Article 3(1) permits those under twenty 
years of age to acquire legitimate child status through parental marriage or 
legal acknowledgment by the father, a process known as “Ninchi” in 
Japanese.193
In Japan, the family relationship between a mother and child starts at 
birth.194 The child is a legitimate child of the mother.195 Under Article 3(1) 
of the Japanese Nationality Act, the father is eligible to acknowledge 
(Ninchi) only while the mother is pregnant, in cases where the mother and 
father are not married.196 However, illegitimate children may not acquire 
Japanese citizenship after birth, even when they are acknowledged by the 
father.197 These illegitimate children can acquire Japanese citizenship only 
after the mother and father become legally married.198
The Supreme Court majority held that Article 3 of the Nationality Act 
was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of Article 14 of the 
Japanese Constitution.199 Article 10 of the Japanese Constitution provides 
that Japanese nationality is fixed by statute.200 The Japanese Nationality 
Act provides requirements for acquiring or losing Japanese nationality.201
The nation's traditional, political, social, and economic environment 
works to fix these requirements of nationality in the legislature.  The 
distinction caused by the requirements for nationality under the Nationality 
Act would be unconstitutional if this distinction were to have no reasonable 
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grounds for justification.  If the legislature acts beyond the scope of its 
discretion, the judiciary can regard the provision as unconstitutional under 
the equal protection clause of Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution.
Japanese nationality is a very important legal status that protects not 
only fundamental rights but also one’s eligibility to receive public 
assistance.  A child who is born cannot change his or her condition—
whether or not the parents are married—by his or her own effort or ability.
In 1984, the Nationality Act was amended to grant Japanese 
nationality only after the father and mother got married, apart from the 
process of legitimation (Jun-sei).202 On the other hand, children born of a 
Japanese father and a non-Japanese mother can receive Japanese nationality 
through acknowledgement by the father during the pregnancy of the 
mother.203 This amendment works to follow the principle of jus sanguinis.
The legislature was of the opinion that those children who could not acquire 
Japanese nationality by nature would be able to establish a “close 
relationship” with a foreign country, apart from Japan.204
Article 3(1) of the Japanese Nationality Act used jus sanguinis and the 
legal marriage between a Japanese father and a non-Japanese mother to 
mean a close relationship with Japan.205 The distinction in Article 3(1) of 
the Japanese Nationality Act was based on reasonability of purpose at the 
time it was amended in 1984.
In this case, the plaintiff submitted registration for Japanese nationality 
in 2003, at which time the legislative argument to support constitutionality 
had already been lost.206 The decision to strike down Article 3(1) of the 
Japanese Nationality Act as unconstitutional did not mean that all 
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provisions, including legitimation, became void in their entirety. 207
Legitimation to cover the principle of jus sanguinis still remained.208
The Supreme Court cited the patricide case and used the purpose and 
means to achieve a goal approach.209 A change of legislative fact was one 
of the critical factors.  Japanese concrete judicial review only addressed the 
individual plaintiffs in this case and excluded others in the same position.  
In any case, the legislature amended the Japanese Nationality Act in 
2008. 210 It is not clear how long the judiciary needs to declare that 
legislative facts have changed so as to make a statute obsolete.
IV. TWO FAMILY LAW DECISIONS IN 2015
In December 2015, the Japanese Supreme Court rendered two 
decisions in the area of family law.  The Court upheld Article 750 of the 
Civil Code as constitutional, requiring a married couple to choose either the 
husband’s or the wife’s family name. 211 The Court emphasized the 
Japanese tradition of using the same family name for a couple.212 On the 
one hand, the Court struck down Article 733 of the Civil Code, which 
prohibited women from remarrying within six months of a divorce.213 On 
the other hand, the Court stated that a 100-day waiting period was 
constitutionally reasonable.214
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A. Same Surname Decision in 2015
The Supreme Court upheld Article 750 of the Civil Code as 
constitutional in December 2015.215 The plaintiffs sought damages as a 
result of legislative inaction to amend Article 750 of the Civil Code.216
They argued that they had a right not to be forced to change their family 
name upon marriage, and that social pressure and discrimination to change 
the family name to that of the husband’s family name infringed upon their 
equal protection rights under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution.217
Those who wanted to keep the wife’s family name could not get married, 
which infringed upon the freedom to marry as provided in Article 24 of 
Japanese Constitution and also violated the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.218
The Supreme Court responded that the right not to be forced to change 
one’s family name is a personal right and a symbol of one’s personality.219
The articles of the Civil Code regulate and control concrete personal rights 
in light of the constitution.  The Supreme Court thought that it was 
inappropriate to argue that being forced to change one’s family name upon 
marriage infringed upon the personal rights set forth in the constitution.220
The intent of the articles regulating the family under the Civil Code,
confirming that members using the same surname would belong to the same 
family, reflect a fundamental component of society. Their purpose is 
constitutionally reasonable. Change of family status is subject to an 
individual’s will upon marriage, and thus, females are not forced to give up 
their surname against their will.221 The family name has an identification 
function in relation to others, and the right to establish or change one’s own 
family name depends solely upon one’s own will.  A change of surname 
upon marriage is expected.
Responding to the argument that it is an infringement of equal rights 
under the constitution, the Supreme Court stated that Article 750 did not 
discriminate based on gender. No formal unequal treatment was caused by 
Article 750 because the majority of couples use the husband’s surname and 
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because husbands and wives discuss and conclude which family name is to 
be adopted.222
The Supreme Court explained that the purpose of Article 24 of the 
Japanese Constitution, which guarantees the right to choose whether to 
marry, whom to marry, and when to marry, is subject to individual 
choice.223 On the other hand, Article 750 of the Civil Code addresses the
effects of marriage.224 Giving up a marriage because of Article 750 does 
not necessarily lead to an infringement of Article 24 of the constitution.  
Married women can use their family name as their common name in their 
social lives.
The Supreme Court further explained that Article 24 of the 
constitution is only a suggestion and guideline for the legislature.225 The
family is regulated under the general perspective of relationships between 
parents and family, and couples are subject to the times in which they live.
These influences include national tradition, social factors, and 
circumstances surrounding the family. Personal rights and equal protection 
rights take various forms and legislative discretion is very broad.  The 
means to achieve the goal are further fixed by social status, the environment 
in which people are living, and the standpoint of the family as it changes 
from time to time.
The judiciary reviews the effects of this system under Article 24 of the 
Constitution and reviews the reasonableness of Article 750 in light of 
human dignity and equal treatment between males and females.226 The 
same surname tradition was established in 1898.227 It is reasonable to think 
that having the same surname is a fundamental component of being a 
family.  A child born between a husband and a wife using the same 
surname is then assumed to be legitimate and protected under their 
guardianship.
Five dissenting opinions saw Article 750 of the Civil Code as 
unconstitutional.228 Justice Kiyoko Okabe noted in her opinion that the 
number of females working outside the home is increasing and that it is 
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reasonable for a woman to keep her family name after marriage.229 Without 
exception, the use of a different surname for a woman could cause a loss of 
personal identification. The majority of couples using the husband’s 
surname reflects the actual power balance in our society.  A requirement to 
change one’s surname could be unconstitutional in so far as it infringes 
upon one’s personal identification and leads to a sense of losing one’s 
identity.230 One cannot use an alias in public documents and identification 
by an alias versus official name brings about new issues.  Women are 
participating more and more in society such that the background of the 
provision is becoming lost.  Losing one’s identity goes against the dignity 
of the individual and gender equality under Article 24 of the constitution.231
Furthermore, Justice Okabe emphasized that instances of divorce, 
remarriage, non-marriage, and late marriage are increasing and that the 
function of the surname is being lost.232
Justice Michiyoshi Kiuchi argued in his dissenting opinion that Article 
750 of the Civil Code should be unconstitutional because at least one 
person in the couple is obligated to give up his or her surname.233
Justice Kiuchi doubts that the sense of being a family member is 
cultivated through the same surname.234 Children are not born with a sense 
of whether they have the same surname as other family members.  Having 
the same surname is not proof of a relationship between a child and a parent 
or of being a married couple.
Justice Yoshiki Yamaura concurred with Justice Okabe and noted that 
the Diet has the responsibility to amend Article 750.235 He referenced a 
Korean Constitutional Court decision that held a similar provision in Korea 
to be unconstitutional.236 The same opinion has also been referenced by the 
Commission of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women.237
This decision was controversial among Japanese constitutional 
scholars.  The scholars criticized the majority for allowing broad legislative 
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discretion and denying personal rights that are protected under the 
constitution.  A name signifies a person under a legal system, which leads 
to attachment to that name.238
The Court explained that a surname has meaning as an individual’s 
name, because the family name and the first name work together to identify 
a person in society.239 Scholars criticized the majority opinion by stating 
that the family name belongs to society.  A certain uniform standard is 
needed. Unlike the first name, a family name has an important function in 
recognizing members of “one” family.240 A surname is assumed to change 
when family relationships change in instances such as marriage.241 Thus, 
Article 750 is related to personal rights protected under Article 13 of the 
constitution.
Kazuyuki Takahashi explains that a name is used to identify oneself in 
social life. 242 Recognizing the vital function of people living with 
autonomy in social life, this constitutional right is guaranteed.  Takahashi 
opines that the Court should have analyzed whether there is a legitimate 
public interest in changing a surname. 243 The majority opinion 
distinguished the surname from the first name, stating that a surname is 
granted by the government but is not guaranteed as a human right.244 For
Takahashi, this was an arbitrary interpretation.245
The legislature has discussed revising Article 750 since 1996. 246
Former Justice Tokuji Izumi argued that the mission of the judiciary had 
been abandoned because the cabinet did not propose a bill and the 
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legislature did not amend the law, leading the plaintiff to take the issue to 
court in this case.247
The majority opinion must have responded by saying that Article 750 
conflicts with the ICCPR.248 Miyoko Tsujimura was disappointed that the 
court did not mention the ICCPR and thinks that, in the future, the Court 
will allow all people to retain their surnames after getting married if they so 
choose.249 The right of a married couple to use separate surnames is within 
the legislature’s discretion.250
B. Prohibition of Remarriage Decision in 2015 
The Supreme Court251 held Article 733(1)252 to be unconstitutional 
beyond the 100-day waiting period. In this case, the wife-plaintiff divorced 
her former husband in 2008 because of domestic violence and because she
was pregnant by her current partner.253 She needed to wait for six months 
after the divorce before she could remarry. 254 In 2011, she claimed 
emotional damage, resulting from legislative inaction to amend Article 772 
of the Civil Code, in the Okayama District Court.255 The district court and 
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the Hiroshima High Court held the requirement to be constitutional.256 The 
plaintiffs argued that this provision was unconstitutional under Articles 14
and 24 of the Japanese Constitution.257 The Legislative Council of the 
Ministry of Justice advised in 1996 that Article 733 should provide a 100-
day waiting period, but conservative members of the Diet prevented an 
amendment to Article 733.258
It is necessary to examine Article 772 259 before analyzing Article 
733(1).  Article 772 of the Civil Code provides for three scenarios 
regarding the status of a child.260 First, a child conceived during marriage is
presumed to be the child of the husband.261 Second, a child born within 300 
days after divorce is presumed to be the child of the divorced husband.262
Third, a child born after remarriage is presumed to be the child of the new 
husband.263
When a wife gets a divorce and remarries immediately, a child born 
within 200 days after the divorce would be presumed to be the child of the 
ex-husband and not of the new husband. 264 Therefore, the period of 
prohibition of remarriage was provided for in Article 733(1). 265 A
duplication of presumptions occurs from the 201st to the 300th day, but 
Article 733 prohibited remarriage for a six-month period in any event.266
In December 2015, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court held 
that the purpose of Article 733(1) is to avoid duplication of the presumption 
of paternity so as to prevent paternity-related disputes.267 At the time the 
Civil Code was drafted, during the Meiji Constitution era, it was considered 
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reasonable to impose a remarriage ban of six months, which is longer than 
the present 100 days, not only for the couple but also in the interest of the 
child.
The legislature generally regulates family and couple relationships by 
taking into consideration national tradition, social factors, and 
circumstances surrounding the family.  Article 24 of the Japanese 
Constitution sets limits on legislative discretion.268 The judiciary reviews 
provisions in light of their reasonableness to sustain the constitutionality of 
these provisions as established by the legislative branch.  Today, as medical 
technology develops, this foundation is being lost.  The Supreme Court said 
that imposing a 100-day waiting period was reasonable and appropriate but 
imposing a period beyond 100 days would be unconstitutional and 
unreasonable.269
Justices Ryuko Sakurai, Katsumi Chiba, Takehiko Ohtani, Yoshinobu 
Ohnuki, Naoto Ohtani, and Tsuneyuki Yamamoto wrote concurring 
opinions.270 They agreed with the majority that a waiting period of 100 
days was constitutional under Article 14 or 24(2) of the Japanese 
Constitution.271 They believed that the prohibition period should be as 
short as possible.272 Even within 100 days, the prohibition of remarriage 
must be lifted in certain cases.273 The purpose of Article 733 was thought 
to be sustained as long as it avoided a presumption of two fathers and 
prevented disputes regarding paternity.274
The lack of presumption of paternity is not limited to cases where a 
child is born within 100 days under Article 733(2).275 There are cases 
where the biological mother was too old to be pregnant or paternity was not 
presumed, because the husband was missing for three years. 276
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Additionally, when the wife has undergone sterilization, it is clear that she 
cannot bear a child.277
When the couple registers a marriage, the officer reviews only the 
formal documentary items. 278 Thus, new couples must file medical 
evidence to rebut a presumption of paternity by the former husband if the 
woman has been previously married.279
Justice Kaoru Onimaru opined that all of Article 733 was 
unconstitutional because the overlap of the presumption occurs only in 
exceptional and limited cases.280 Even though the purpose of Article 733 is 
legitimate, a uniform prohibition to cover rare cases is too broad to 
maintain reasonableness under Articles 14 and 24 of the Japanese 
Constitution.281 Clear and simple regulations should be prepared by the 
legislature for family and couple relationships.
Justice Michiyoshi Kiuchi explained that scientific DNA data analysis 
can objectively clarify paternity. 282 Therefore, a prohibition period for 
remarriage to prevent confusion of paternity is no longer meaningful.
Justice Yoshiki Yamaura’s dissenting opinion argued that Article 
733(2) restricts women through a legal technique to prevent the 
presumption of fatherhood.283 There are very few instances where a woman 
bears a child where the question of paternity overlaps with the former and 
the new husband.  A prohibition covering all women is meaningless.  An 
individual remedy for children should be provided by the legislature. 
Justice Yamaura showed how a South Korean Constitutional Law Court 
held a similar provision of the Civil Code to be unconstitutional in 2005.284
The remarriage prohibition and the same surname decision in 2015 
illustrates several points.  First, the judiciary will refrain from acting 
beyond legislative discretion and restricts the scope of its decisions on
unconstitutionality.  It should provide guidelines for the legislature to 
follow in amending laws when necessary.  The members of the Diet are not 
legal experts.  A simpler and easier message would be helpful for them to 
react to court decisions.  In this case, the court struck down the additional 
eighty days as unconstitutional and held that a waiting period of 100 days 
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was constitutional. 285 The parliament should modify Article 733 
immediately.  Even though technology continues to develop, paternity 
disputes lead to litigation costs that can still be burdensome for the general 
public.286
Second, the minority opinion of the Supreme Court is not critical to 
the parties in these particular cases, but over time, it could function as the 
majority opinion.  Constitutional law scholars have the responsibility to 
disseminate these opinions throughout Japan.
C. Local Government and Same Sex Marriage
Under Article 24 of the Japanese Constitution, the phrase “the mutual 
consent of both sexes” is subject to interpretation.287 If this language means 
both females and males, it would be unconstitutional to admit same-sex 
marriage.  Otherwise, it would be constitutional to read that “of both sexes” 
means “of two parties.”  This interpretation would prohibit polygamy.
Several decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court show that it takes a 
long time to pass or amend statutes in the Diet.  Article 41 of the Japanese 
Constitution provides that legislative power belongs solely to the Diet.288
Deliberations in parliament under constitutionalism shall consider the 
opinions of the minority, marginalized people, and freedom of speech as
these are channeled between the legislature and the people.
When the deliberative floor of central Tokyo does not work well, the 
local government might be a model for the Diet. Chapter 8 of the Japanese 
Constitution provides for local self-government.289 A local government 
may pass ordinances for regions within its jurisdiction, but not for all of 
Japan’s territory.
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In 2015, Shibuya ward passed an ordinance to deal with relationships 
of same-sex couples in the same way as legal marriage.290 The reason for 
passing this ordinance was that some lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) couples could not rent rooms and were prevented from 
visiting their partners in the hospital for medical checkups or other 
procedures. 291 Shibuya ward approved eight couples and issued them 
registration documents.292
In Setagaya ward, the mayor issued a protocol for the registration of 
same-sex couples as partnerships. 293 Twenty-nine couples have 
registered.294 Yokohama city opened space for members of the LGBT 
community to communicate.295 In Chiba city, more than fifty percent of 
citizens are projected to register as same-sex couples.296
Registered same-sex couples do not receive the same tax and 
inheritance treatment as legally married couples. 297 These ordinances 
motivate the Diet to pass relevant statutes, although strong conservative 
members object to amending the Japanese Constitution.
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V. THE FUNCTION OF A DECISION THAT STRIKES DOWN A LAW AS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In Japan, the effect of a decision on the constitutionality of a law 
applies only to the litigants in the case under concrete judicial review.  The 
decision on the unconstitutionality of a law by the Supreme Court has no 
function to automatically delete the provisions at issue because the law-
making power belongs solely to the Diet.  The drafting history of the 
Japanese Constitution shows that there was serious concern over leaving 
absolute power to the judiciary.  The concern was over the issue of where
sovereign power should reside.
Although a decision on the unconstitutionality of a law only binds the 
parties and the government in a particular case, it must be respected by the 
other branches of government.  As in Article 200 of the Criminal Code, the 
prosecutor applied the provision governing regular murder, Article 199 and 
not Article 200, for a murder case where a child killed his or her parents 
after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision on the relevant case.298
Soon after the remarriage prohibition case in 2015, the Ministry of 
Justice notified municipalities to accept marriage registrations as early as 
100 days after a divorce.299 The legislature must respect decisions on the
unconstitutionality of a law and rapidly amend or abolish the pertinent
provisions.  However, it took twenty-two years to amend the relevant 
statutes in the patricide case.
These cases illustrate some of the obstacles in the floor deliberations 
of the Diet.  There is no specific time limit obligating the legislature to 
amend or abolish statutes under the Japanese Constitution, although the 
Supreme Court indicates some guidelines for legislative action.
Decisions on the unconstitutionality of a law are retroactive only for 
litigants and do not generally hold for other cases under concrete judicial 
review and Article 41, as the Diet has the sole law-making power.
By analyzing the scope of the decisions on the unconstitutionality of 
various laws, it might be possible to distinguish criminal from civil and 
administrative cases.  In criminal law, court decisions generally apply 
retroactively, but final decisions would not automatically invalidate other 
past decisions.  In administrative or civil law cases, decisions in general do 
not apply retroactively.
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The Supreme Court announces decisions on the unconstitutionality of 
a law, and sends them to the cabinet and the Diet.  This means that the 
decision should hold for similar cases in the future.  Judicial review under 
the Japanese Constitution is a concrete rather than an abstract review.  The 
application of a decision on the unconstitutionality of a law means that the 
application of that law to the specific facts of a concrete case will be 
unconstitutional even as the text of the statute on its face remains 
constitutional.300
Regarding Article 900(iv), the order that rendered the provision 
unconstitutional in 2013, limited its effect to a specified time scale on the 
ground that the legal stability of family relationships for inheritance 
purposes needed to be maintained.301 If the distribution to an heir was 
already fixed by an agreement or judgment, the legal relationship would be 
complete.  The 2013 order did not overrule the 1995 constitutional order, 
but it managed to maintain legal stability through the uniform treatment of 
families—preventing confusion with other family relationships.302
These decisions did not set forth a time limit for the legislature to act.
In subsequent analyses, when voting on disparity cases, the Japanese 
Supreme Court reached decisions on the unconstitutionality of laws, even 
as these provisions remained effective through the Administrative 
Litigation Act. 303 In 1976, the Supreme Court adopted the Iken-Jotai
condition doctrine for the first time by invoking Article 31(1) of the 
Administrative Case Litigation Act in an action for revocation of an 
administrative decision. 304 It used an application by analogy method, 
known as Jijo Hanketsu. 305 The 1976 decision rejected the claim that 
                                                     
300. Saikō Saibanashō [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 28, 1962, Showa 30(o) no. 2961, 16 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1593 (Japan) (involving confiscation of the property of third parties, this 
was a controversial decision as to whether the law at issue was unconstitutional on its face or in its 
application); see also SATO 2011, supra note 40, at 671; NONAKA ET AL. II, supra note 164, at 323, 
332(c).
301. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 4, 2013, Heisei 24 (kyo) no. 985, 67(6) SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1320, http://www.courts.go.jp (Japan).
302. Id.
303. Yuichiro Tsuji, Vote Value Disparity and Judicial Review, SINGAPORE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016).
304. Gyousei Jiken Soshō Hou [Administrative Case Litigation Act.], Act no. 139 of 1962, art. ?
31, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp
/law/detail/?id=1922&vm=04&re=02 (Japan).
305. Id.
176 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:1
Article 219 of the Public Officer Election Act clearly prohibited the 
application of Article 31(1) of the Administrative Case Litigation Act.306
The Supreme Court explained that parliament must address 
unconstitutional states or conditions within a reasonable time.307 If it fails 
to do so, the judiciary can make a determination of unconstitutionality.  
Today, lower courts can declare unconstitutionality in cases of voting 
disparities.  In the disparity voting case referenced above, the effect was not 
retroactive for the litigants.
Dissenting or concurring opinions are not critical as precedent to bind 
future cases, but they play the role of sending a message to other 
government branches.  For the cases involving Article 733 of the Civil 
Code, the dissenting opinion of Yamaura noted that, under the Meiji 
Constitution, the old patriarchy had been maintained in the Civil Code, 
while Justice Kiuchi suggested the availability of advanced medical 
technology.308 Additionally, after the decisions on the unconstitutionality 
of the law but before amendment by the legislature, the Ministry of Justice 
ordered the office of municipalities to accept marriage registrations just 100 
days after divorce.309 As in the patricide case, the conservative members of 
parliament are reluctant to respond in some cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the Meiji Constitution, women did not enjoy the same rights as 
men.  Female suffrage was not recognized and women could not form 
associations or take part in the parliament.  Under the old Civil Code, only 
the eldest son succeeded to the property of the family.
A young American lady who was raised in Japan suggested an 
advanced proposal for equal rights after working with the GHQ.  The 
Japanese government, however, rejected her proposal because they 
referenced traditions that did not exist in Japan.
The Japanese Constitution provides for equal rights in Articles 14 and 
24 by stating that marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of 
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both sexes, and that it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation on 
the basis of equal rights between the husband and the wife.310
The constitution governs the relationship between the government and 
private citizens.  The judiciary uses the constitution in some cases to 
invalidate contracts between companies and laborers.  There are 
controversies with regard to whether constitutional norms directly apply to 
relationships among private citizens.
In 1986, three major statutes to guarantee equal protection were 
passed, impacting the fields of labor and national pension.311
Decisions of the judiciary have been influential as a remedy for 
unequal treatment in conventional family law.  Under concrete judicial 
review, the judiciary sends messages to the legislature to revise statutes.  
Article 41 declares that the sole law-making organ is the Diet, so the 
judiciary cannot amend the statutes being reviewed. 312 Under concrete 
judicial review, the judgment only applies to the parties in litigation.  In the 
patricide case, the Ministry of Justice did not prosecute under the article in 
question in similar cases.
In the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children, the 
Supreme Court held Article 900 to be constitutional in 1995.313 This case 
shows that conventional customs survive even under the current Japanese 
Constitution.  Dissenting opinions argued that children cannot choose their 
parents and are subject to uncontrollable attributions.314 Decisions on the 
unconstitutionality of a law may cause other similar family relationship 
issues.  The dissenting justice proposed that the decision should not be 
retroactive, but this proposal did not receive the support of the majority.315
In 2013, the Supreme Court announced by order that Article 900 was 
unconstitutional.316 The Grand Bench of the Supreme Court called all 
fifteen justices to change precedent and determine the constitutionality of 
the order and statutes.317 The 2013 order did not overrule the 1995 order.  
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The 2013 order noted that Article 900 would control in the absence of a 
designation of the shares of inheritance by a will and pointed out that some 
factors to limit legislative discretion such as tradition, social conditions and 
public sentiment, would change along with the times.318 First, this order 
shows that dissenting opinions may subsequently become mainstream in 
Japanese family law decisions.
Second, the Court may reveal a lack of attention by the legislature.  
The judiciary is obligated to constantly review statutes and hold them 
unconstitutional if the legislative facts that supported the statutes have 
changed.  Recommending a change of legislative fact is a helpful tool to 
receive majority support among justices, thus avoiding serious conflicts and 
delays in amending the statute.  It also encourages the legislature to amend 
statutes.  However, legal stability may be sacrificed through such decisions.  
The 1995 order supported legislative fact in favor of constitutionality by 
making reference to several influences including tradition, social 
environment, perception of the people, and other factors.  Justices do not 
have to change the general standard of judicial review but can depend on 
changed legislative fact.
Third, the Ministry of Justice can quickly respond when it receives 
understandable messages from the judiciary.  This limits the scope of an 
order declaring similar cases unconstitutional.  The judiciary cannot state a 
specific time limit for the legislature to amend a statute.  The 2008 decision 
under the Nationality Act shows that the judiciary may review legislative 
purpose and the means a law uses to achieve a goal even when that goal is
not yet clear.319 This decision supported the legislative fact carried forward 
from1984 even though it had been lost by 2008.  It is not clear how long it 
will take for the judiciary to declare that a legislative fact has changed and 
that statutes are now obsolete.  A 2015 decision also upheld the article in 
the Civil Code addressing surnames for couples.320 The Supreme Court 
stated that family traditions have not changed so much to allow the 
judiciary to declare this provision unconstitutional.321 Constitutional law 
scholars are mainly against this decision.  Another 2015 decision held 
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Article 733(1) to be unconstitutional regarding limitations on remarriage.322
In this case, national tradition, social factors, and other circumstances 
contributed to the decision.323 This case shows that a judicial decision can 
be used as a guideline for the legislature to amend a statute in question in a 
certain way.
Fourth, while a minority opinion of the Supreme Court may not be 
critical for the parties to the case at bar, it can function as a majority 
opinion in the future.
Fifth, several decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court show that it 
takes the Diet a significant amount of time to pass or amend a statute.  
Local government initiatives can serve as models for statutes in the Diet.
The decisions of the Supreme Court have led the dialogue on how 
couples and families should act in Japanese society.  The judiciary can gain 
trust as a fair umpire of the general public discourse through the 
persuasiveness of its decisions.  Tradition, legislative discretion, and 
legislative fact are some of the interpretive tools that judges may use.
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